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ABSTRACT
I intend to investigate established theoretical and
embodied accounts of identities excluded within Western

heteronormative society in order to seek out how those
embodiments and theories may parallel what I contend is

another impossible subject position — the child male

victim of adult female sexual violence. The first chapter
lays out the mise-en-scene of underlying assumptions of the
study and how those assumptions help carve the discursive

space I seek.

In the second chapter I examine how Judith Butler and

Gloria Anzaldua have elucidated and embodied the excluded

possibilities inherent in compulsory heterosexuality and
along the way ask: to what extent do those theoretical

positions help illuminate the subject position,

subjectivity and subjection of "male victim of female
sexual violence?" I will explore how these examples may
mark out a space, even if that body is constructed by its
absence, or by what is not said about it.

This brings up uncomfortable questions: Are not there

bodies that cannot, by definition, be queer? What right do
those bodies have to attempt to appropriate queer? How can

this body (male victim of female) even exist? In light of
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the first two questions, I purposefully stop short of any
claim to queer the body in question. I contend that it is

the reasonableness of the last question that provides the
impetus for the project -- the impossibility of the body

calls for the search.
The third chapter examines to what extent one film,

Lousi Malle's Murmur of the Heart, represents the
exigencies of compulsory heterosexuality.
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CHAPTER ONE

IS THERE A MALE VICTIM?

The Invisible Man
In early 2008, I presented an abbreviated version of
this paper at a conference panel entitled "Trauma and
Performance." In the paper I briefly suggest that the sex

act between mother and son in Louis Malle's film Murmur of
the Heart demonstrates that heterosexual society's need for

boys to become men -- by performing the heterosexual act of

coitus -- outweighs the traumatic abuse of power that the
act represents.
The moderator asked me how I knew there was trauma; in
other words, how did I know that the boy in the film was

traumatized? What if he did not experience the event as

trauma? -Indeed, the film implies that that the boy is
released from problems that 'have plagued him throughout the
film by the event.1 My difficulty in answering the question

pointed out the exact issue that lies at the root of the
phenomenon I had set out to investigate. The moderator, in
my view, interpreted my assertion as a simple endorsement

of the primary prohibition of incest.
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Gender studies has pushed to understand how social

construction of certain physical acts as, variously,
foolish, deviant, and/or dangerous controls the erotic.

This led many, including me, to question whether all sexual
practices are always (already) controlled by discursively

produced norms, and therefore to question those norms,
which include the primary prohibition of incest. The

moderator's question falls in this general area of concern,
but also enacts the production of one of the norms I seek

to investigate - the dissonance between prohibition of sex

between adults and children and the older woman ushering a
young boy into sexuality fantasy that recurs in Western

cinema and reinforces the view of the moderator.
There are several questions at play here. One concerns

the notion of sex as an exercise of power; specific sexual
practices may be enacted consensually or non-consensually.

Sex, in this scenario, is only one possible means by which

a person may wield power. Does consent not nullify that
exercise of power?
The first question leads, necessarily, to others: can
consent (like human rights) be subverted by social

construction? Could a person in a lower position of power

dismiss or deny his/her access to consent via Foucaultian '
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self-regulation? How might such scenarios render the
subversion of consent invisible?

Identity Formation

Much of the early theoretical work of gender studies
and other post-structural/postmodern identity studies
cataloged the ways in which discourse produces, normalizes,

controls, and enforces available identity categories. This
work started with feminism's search for women missing

(literally) in/from the canon and expanded to the search

for what it means to be different. Philosophers, critics
and radical thinkers have outlined ways in which

heteronormative society produces the cultural, sexual, and

social categories it seeks to inscribe.
This work was necessarily disembodied; it radically

reconsidered identity categories - by examining what
identities are available, to whom they are available, under

what conditions they come into being, and what material

conditions are produced as a consequence. The study had to

exclude, almost by intent, the specific experiences of
specific bodies.
Some theorists (identified as queer) recognized this

disjuncture between identity categories and the experiences
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of the bodies that are said to occupy them. Although
referring primarily to race, Teresa de Lauretis notes that,

"A gay Chicano writer cannot identify with the white middle
class gay community of the Castro... [and a] Chicana lesbian

might well choose to make her community with Native
American women rather than with lesbians period"
("Introduction" ix). Consequently, it seems likely that the

"category mistakes" (Butler, "Imitation" 309) that de
Lauretis asserts would apply not only to those bodies
constructed in subordinate identities, but also to

ostensibly charmed or favored bodies. In other words, it
might be just as likely that the identity category of white
heterosexual man or woman may fail to account for the

experience of a specific man or woman constructed into that

category.
This possibility, however, is fraught with difficulty.

This theoretical dismantling of the idea of stable identity

categories appears to erase difference - after all, if
identity is constructed, is not everyone the same
underneath? The fact that category mistakes may occur in
superordinate identity categories is troublesome,

especially if these mistakes can be said to be an iteration
of queer. People do not have the power in and of themselves
4

to change material conditions, and certain identities are

constituted with lesser social value. In fact, as de
Lauretis demonstrates in a quotation from Audre Lorde's
Zami (about two lesbians of different race), differences in

material conditions are experiences that may well override
identity: "Muriel seemed to believe we were...all equal in

our outsiderhood...It was wishful thinking based on little
fact; the ways in which it was true languished in the

shadow of those many ways in which it would always be

false" (qtd in de Lauretis, "Introduction" x). This
scenario -- in which the experiences of bodies that might,
through the eyes of a heteronormative culture, seem the

same but actually diverge — presents a conundrum with

political consequences. Some theorists/activists have
chosen to address this problem by setting queer aside and

reclaiming identity categories for necessary political

purposes.

It almost seems that a balkanization of identity

categories must occur to effect change.
Further, as Judith Butler notes, "That any

consolidation of identity requires some set of
differentiations and exclusions seems clear...If the
rendering visible of lesbian/gay identity now presupposes a
set of exclusions, then perhaps part of what is necessarily
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excluded is the future uses of the sign" ("Imitation" 311).

The consolidation she considers has as its goal the radical
re-appropriation of the category. This political goal may
indeed provide a site for the survival of specific bodies

constructed into those categories, but it also tends to
perpetuate differences and solidify the (apparent) need to
choose identity categories. As Foucault demonstrates, these
categories are already sustained by church, state, legal,
educational and other insidiously immovable systems.

Importantly, these practical moves — away from stable

identity, then toward claimed identity — did not provide,
could not provide for anybody that might not fit exactly

into a category or that might cross, straddle, or exist

between categories, unless that body could/would claim a

single identity. However, theoretically at least, it seems
queer theory could do those things.

De Lauretis ends her piece with a hopeful question:
could queer theory "construct another discursive horizon,

another way of living the racial and the sexual?"
("Introduction" xi). while it may or may not be able to

counteract the violent homophobia that plagues Western
culture, if queer theory can continue to provide a way to

embody the myriad ways compulsory heterosexuality fails to
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bring voice to the experiences of all the bodies that do

not fit, radical change may yet occur.

Male Masculinity

In this section and the next I examine two discursive

productions related to identity: normative "male
masculinity" and its exigencies; and the "victim of sexual

violence," especially "male'victim." I will argue that
production of the former sets up a structure in which the
latter only exists as a nonconsensual act between gendered

males.
David Halperin, following Michel Foucault, asserts

that "the individuating function .of sexuality, its role in

generating sexual identities" ("Is" 420) is a product of

the nineteenth century. In the sexual practices of free
Greek males, there was a "more generalized ethos of
penetration and domination...structured by the presence or

absence of ...the phallus" (421). Further, the protocols for
how this penetration/domination equation overrode
(indicated) gender are present as well. The concern of

Greek society was "the male desire to be penetrated by
males, for such a desire represent[ed] a voluntary

abandonment of the culturally constructed masculine
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identity in favor of the culturally constructed feminine
one" (422). According to Halperin, domination is masculine
and can be performed solely by the penetrator. Males who

are dominated are consequently not masculine.

Halperin demonstrates the same discursive production
>

in Jack Abbott's society (juvenile detention and prison);
"the division of the society into superordinate and

subordinate groups" (425) falls along constructed gender

lines, and the only available identification for
subordinate is (male) femininity. Male masculinity is the
sole province of the superordinate group.

Tomas Almaguer extends this understanding of the
production of male masculinity/femininity to the
Mexican/Latin American sexual system. Using examples of

male homosexual practices in Nicaragua, Mexico, and the

U.S., Almaguer notes how gender-associated masculine and
feminine roles trump fixed sexual identity. Penetration is

active and masculine, while "[t]he stigma conferred to the

passive role is fundamentally inscribed in gender-coded
terms" ("Chicano" 258). The implication is clear: male

femininity produces a "passive agent [who] is an abject,
degraded being" (259). Put another way, if the male is not

masculine (read "penetrating"), his existence as a male is

in question. In terms of "object choice," masculinity is a
moving target.

Gendered Norms
The fear of our desires keeps them suspect and
indiscriminately powerful, for to suppress any
truth is to give it strength beyond endurance.

The fear that we cannot grow beyond whatever

distortions we may find within ourselves keeps us
docile and loyal and obedient, externally
defined, and leads us to accept many facets of

our oppression as women.
- Audre Lorde, "The Uses of the Erotic"

Gender coding within heteronormativity limits

available subject positions for everyone. De Lauretis
concludes, after a consideration of the function of
castration in identity formation, "[h]aving nothing to
lose, in^other words, women cannot desire; having no

phallic capital to invest or speculate on, as men do, women
cannot be investors in the marketplace of desire but are
instead commodities that circulate in it" ("Lure" 217).

Compulsory heterosexuality does not/cannot produce a female
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who is not a commodity, that is, the subject "active woman"

(in the sexual sense) cannot exist.
Further, de Lauretis, demonstrating that the "most

common" "object/sign of lesbian desire...in modern Western
cultures...is some form of what is coded as masculinity"

(243), writes that this is because
not only is masculinity associated with sexual
activity and desire, imaged in the erect penis
and its symbolic or ritual representation in the

phallus; but...in a cultural tradition pervasively
homophobic, masculinity alone carries a strong

connotation of sexual desire for the female body.

(243)
This passage, while it asserts grounds for lesbian desire,

inscribes the normative grounds by which masculine (read
"real") males are produced. It connotes males' desire for

the female body and suggests that access to the female body
must be' (or have been) desired. Since activity codes
masculinity, a sort of reverse logic works to re-figure all
activity as having come from the male, whether it does or

not.
Butler puts the interconnectedness of gender coding

and excluded sexual possibilities this way, "both gender
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presentation and sexual practices may corollate such that

it appears that the former 'expresses' the latter, and yet
both are jointly constituted by the very sexual

possibilities that they exclude" ("Imitation" 315). This
should be as true for the male coded as masculine as it is
true for the masculine female coded masculine and/or
feminine coded male; that is, the excluded sexual

possibilities should form the subject position. In the body
I seek, the disjuncture occurs at the very point that the

excluded sexual possibility forms the abject subject

position (victim of female sexual abuse) from male coded

masculine.
The imperative of male masculinity may be most
forcefully expressed in normative heterosexual relations.

One of the necessary elements in the construction of a male
masculinity is its dependence on its binary opposite "not

male/masculine." Heterocentricity requires this function of
women and enforces it through compulsory heterosexuality, a
term first used by Adrienne Rich.

The Sexual Victim

Adrienne Rich's "Compulsory Heterosexuality" forms the

base of what critics understand about the effects of
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normative heterosexuality on those constructed under it. In

one section of this important work, Rich looks at research

by Kathleen Barry in order to examine the set of conditions
through which sexual violence flourishes. Rich lays out the

complicit role heteronormativity plays in the conditioning
of the female victim of sexual slavery, and of the male

procurer who manipulates her with friendship and love: "The
ideology of heterosexual romance, beamed at her from

childhood out of fairy tales, television, films,
advertising, popular songs, wedding pageantry, is a tool
ready to the procurer's hand and on which he does not

hesitate to use" (Rich 237)" A bit of deconstructive work

uncovers the corollary effect of that same normative

indoctrination on males. If this ideology, beamed to both
males and females alike, establishes the conditions by
which gendered females can be subjected to sexual violence

(become victims), then it must simultaneously produce the

non-condition in the male, which is not "victimizer," but
rather "not victim." Society imbues the normative male with

the impossibility of victimhood as powerfully as it imbue
the gendered female with the possibility of victimhood.
Among other examples, Rich catalogs (and elaborates)

Kathleen Gough's "characteristics- of male power" (qtd in
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"Compulsory" 233) and many of the characteristics associate

to physical dominance: there is the power "to confine," "to
cramp," and "to command" (233). At least one of the
characteristics specifically denotes penetration: "to force

[male sexuality] upon them" (233). Compulsory

heterosexuality equates male/masculine with
dominance/penetration.

The final characteristic elaborated by Rich is the
"'Great Silence' regarding women and particularly lesbian

existence" (233). This erasure, which Rich challenges,
represents the implied impossibility — within
heterocentricity — of gendered females to perform sexual

acts without a gendered male. Since two females alone would
be unable (ostensibly) to penetrate or be penetrated, sex

cannot exist. In a sexual interaction between a gendered
male and female, then, compulsory heterosexuality provides
one possible subject position for the male,

masculine/dominant.
One of the assertions incorrectly attributed to Rich

was that she equated penetrative sex with rape. She
k

disavows the connection in the Afterward to "Compulsory..., '
but the relative ease with which penetration connects to

sexual violence may be productive in understanding how
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sexual violence is constructed. To what extent does sexual
violence rely upon an act of penetration — threatened or

actual?
In the same way that lesbian sexual interaction can be
said not to exist due to the lack of penetration, the

absence of the threat (act) of penetration in a
nonconsensual sexual act with a male initiated by a female
indicates that there can be no victim in the same way that
there was no sex in the former. The idea of a woman raping
a man is incoherent within heteronormative gender coding.
The construction of masculinity/femininity, as

outlined by Rich, Halperin, and Almaguer, suggests that

domination occurs via penetration. More importantly,
domination — and its byproduct, masculinity -- cannot be
produced without penetration.

Rich aptly observes, with regard to the sexual
oppression of women by men, that "[n]ever is it asked

whether, under the conditions of male supremacy, the notion

of 'consent' has any meaning" (235). Similarly, male
supremacy forecloses the possibility of an act of violence

(or sexuality) with a female agent in exactly the same
manner. Rephrasing just slightly, never is it (can it be)

asked whether, under the conditions of male supremacy, the

14

notion of consent (given by male child to an adult woman)

has (can have) any meaning.

The Myth of Affirmative Consent

Consent is a trope in Western democracy. In the trope,
individuals freely give or withhold consent, and consent is
difficult to subvert and durable. As Jonathan Brody

Kramnick suggests, the absence of consent in "modern

democracy or sexuality...would be an injustice or a crime, a
violation of deeply held ideas of political rights and
personal autonomy" (453) . If we examine those expectations

of rights and autonomy, though, something very different
emerges. Kramnick notes that "[b]oth present a root
paradox: consent dwells in the mind, and can only be

inferred in practice; it is at once elemental to legitimacy

and autonomy and beguilingly inaccessible" (453). The

social theory that underpins modern democracy addresses
this inaccessibility explicitly, though; consent is

generally assumed rather than obtained, and silence
indicates its presence. For seventeenth century theorist
John Locke, a concept as basic as "political legitimacy"

rests on the "notion of unspoken and implied consent"
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(456). Citizens do not, then, affirm their consent to be
governed. The trope appears to be a myth.

Locke writes that "every Man, that hath any
Possession, or Enjoyment, of any part of the Dominions of

any Government, doth thereby give his tacit Consent, and is

as far forth obliged to Obedience to the laws of that
government" (qtd in Kramnick 456). If one lives in a

democratic society, then, one consents to its laws. This
foundational principle of democracy — that silence equals
consent — moves almost seamlessly from the civic to the
sexual.

Carole Pateman, in The Sexual Contract, argues

extensively that the "patriarchal right extends throughout
civil society" (4) and thus imbues sexual contracts (such
as, but not limited to, marriage) with the same qualities

that the social contracts of Locke, Hobbes, and Rousseau
do. So individuals consent to sexual relations in exactly

the same way - - implicitly. Conversation analyses of rape
trials demonstrate that, in fact, women must signal non

consent forcefully or the courts may consider them
deficient in their refusal of sex (Kitzinger and Frith,
Ehrlich). Looking at sexual abuse cases, discourse analyst

Clare MacMartin notes that "the implausibility of a
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complaint of sexual abuse is tied to a different aspect of

a child's capacity to give consent - not to sexual abuse,
but to ongoing and repeated social contact with a familiar,

or even familial, accused" (14). Again and again, from the
civic to the sexual, courts, contracts, and individuals
presume consent; beyond that, importantly, individuals in

lower positions of power -- the citizen in the face of the

state, women in relation to men, and children with adults -

- must perform an extraordinary refusal of consent for it
to register with society as such.

Even if we set aside the discursively produced legal
notion that children cannot consent, and presume for a
moment that they could, consent pre-exists as a condition

of civil and sexual life in a democracy. Individuals may

withdraw consent, still a differential in socially

constructed power (male to female, adult to child) allows

the dominant person to reduce or eliminate a subordinate's
access to that withdrawal. Children with adults, like all
individuals in subordinate positions of power, have limited
access to withdrawal of consent, if they have any access.

17

The Male Victim of Sexual Violence
When I was a child

I caught a fleeting glimpse,
Out of the corner of my eye.

I turned to look but it was gone.
I cannot put my finger on it now,

The child is grown, the dream is gone.
- Roger Waters, Comfortably Numb
Rich lays out power differentials as a material
condition of life as a woman: "[cojercion and compulsion

are among the conditions in which women have learned to

recognize our strength" (228) and suggests that "women are
all, in different ways and to different degrees...victims"

(237) of female sexual slavery'. As I have previously
stated, heteronormativity easily inscribes "female victim"
— Rich addresses her call to action against the ease with
which it is deployed. There need not be any adjective

placed ahead of female victim to know that "victimizer"
equals male.

In that foreword, written three years after

"Compulsory Heterosexuality," Rich states about her article
that "there is nothing about such a critique [of the
institution of heterosexuality] that requires us to think
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of ourselves as...totally powerless" (228) and that the

article was written to "encourage heterosexual feminists to

examine heterosexuality...and to change it" (227). According
to Rich, power is absent but available to women; the
presence of available power for women simultaneously

inscribes its available absence for men. The deconstructive
twists to find this absence outline its invisibility.
The male victim of sexual violence is produced only

when a male victimizes another male, relying upon the
heteronormative power of penetration to provide the
mechanism by which the nonconsensual receptive male is

constructed as a victim. All male victims are subsequently
coded "gay." However, the question has to be asked: can

there be coercion without a gendered male victimizer?

In this rigid construction of male/masculine
female/feminine, nonconsensual female sexual violence seems

impossible and is certainly invisible. Male victim exists
only when a male dominates (penetrates) another male. Only

in being dominated (penetrated) and thus identified with

the feminine does the male become a victim. In Rich's notes
for "Compulsory Heterosexuality," in which the author

offers an extensive bibliography of texts on incest, none
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of the titles acknowledges anything but male on female
incest. Male victim does not exist.

In order for a male victim of female sexual violence

to exist within the construct of a heteronormative society,
a passively constructed male would have to exist

simultaneously with the production of an active (read
"penetrating") gendered female. This "impossible"
manifestation of male femininity (and its consequent, male
victim of female sexual violence) within heteronormative
construction may be instructive for understanding its

necessary absence.
The incoherence/absence of the construction "male
victim of female sexual violence" does not indicate its

actual absence. If anything, the erasure calls into
question the disruptive power of such an event. I am left

with only with a question: if there exists "a political
imperative to use the necessary errors or category

mistakes" of "'gay' and 'lesbian'" (Butler 309), does the
category mistake of male victim engender a similar

imperative?
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CHAPTER TWO

OUTLINING THE INVISIBLE

Butler, Anzaldua, and the Abject Being

Judith Butler's work has considered the theoretical
limits of gender, sex, and the material body. In it, Butler

uses the idea of "performativity" to denote the discursive

nature of gender (and sex) that exists through repetition
and reiteration of norms and that, in spite of the
materiality of the body, connotes gender and sex as a

performance, albeit one whose roles are always already

constrained. Butler asserts "that identity is
performatively constituted by the very 'expressions' that

are said to be its results" (qtd in Jagose 84). Further,
she suggests that social construction, far from offering an
ability to choose subjectivity, might better be understood

in inextricable relation to the "natural," which also must
be refigured away from that which "is 'before'
intelligibility, in need of the mark, if not the mar, of

the social to signify, to be known, to acquire value"
(Bodies 4-5). Butler states "it would be a mistake to
associate 'constructivism' with 'the freedom of a subject

to form her/his sexuality as s/he pleases'" (Psychic 94).
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Discussing representations of gender in another piece,
Butler writes that "[t]he 'being' of the subject is no more
self-identical than the 'being' of any gender; in fact,

coherent gender, achieved through an apparent repetition of
the same, produces as its effect the illusion of a prior
and volitional subject" ("Imitation" 314). Butler tempers

this (nearly essentialist) view of construction with the
idea that "[tjhe denial of the priority of the subject,
however, is not the denial of the subject (315); still, the
subject in question is heavily constrained within the

demands of a heteronormative culture.
This frame of reference for the discursive production

of identity (sexuality and gender) serves as a significant
premise of my project: understanding "the recasting of the

matter of bodies as the effect of the dynamic of power"

(Bodies 2). In other words, bodies cannot choose not to be

influenced by a heteronormative culture.
Butler also asserts that "'[sjex' not only functions

as a norm, but is part of the regulatory practice that
produces the bodies it governs" (1). She writes that the
"exclusionary matrix" of this normative practice
requires the simultaneous production of...those who

are not yet 'subjects,' but who form the
22

constitutive outside of the domain of the
subject. ...[And t]his zone of uninhabitability ...

will constitute that site of dreaded
identification. In this sense, then, the subject
is constituted through the force of exclusion and

abjection (3).
Some subjects are formed, then, by exclusion; that

exclusion depends, at least in part, upon the "the abiding
repudiation of some sexual possibilities" (Butler, Psychic

94). The abject being is relegated to the "'unlivable' and
'uninhabitable' zones of social life which are nevertheless
densely populated by those who do not enjoy the status of

the subject, but whose living under the sign of the

'unlivable' is required to circumscribe the domain of the
subject" (Bodies 3).

It seems reasonable to ask if these exclusions include

the "primary prohibitions" of adult/child sex and incest;
if they do, does it matter within compulsory
heterosexuality whether the body in question is "subject"
(agent) or "subject to" (victim)? In other words, from this

perspective, are not both the perpetrator and the victim of

an act of sexual violence constituted as Butlerian abject

beings?
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If the "subject to" position, which might be called
"subjection," can be construed as abject, its relation to

the source of subjection (culture) is significant. This
passage from Butler's The Psychic Life of Power examines

how power and identity work within the subject:
We are used to thinking of power as what presses
on the subject from the outside, as what

subordinates, sets underneath, and relegates to a

lower order. This is surely a fair description of
what power does. But if, following Foucault, we
understand power as forming the subject as well,

as providing the very condition of its existence
and the trajectory of its desire, then power is

not simply what we oppose but also, in a strong
sense, what we depend on for our existence and
what we harbor and preserve in the beings we are.

(2)

This sort of psychic attachment to the power that oppresses
accounts for both the agency that can relieve the

oppression and the always already state of the regulation
that forbids it. There exists a duality of sorts, a subject
whose agency is in question, whose subjectivity exists and

does not. As Butler notes, "[t]he form this power takes is
24

relentlessly marked by a figure of turning, a turning back

upon oneself or even a turning on oneself. This figure
operates as part of the explanation of how a subject is

produced, and so there is no,subject, strictly speaking,
that makes this turn" (3). The non-volitional, turning
subject, never glimpsing itself, whose gender and sexuality

are performatively constituted in the "mime ... already
underway" (Butler, "Imitation" 314), is the absent figure,

the male victim.

Gloria Anzaldua's hybrid work Borderlands/ La

Frontera: The New Mestiza refigures the idea of Borderlands
and how the inhabitants of Borderlands are viewed and view
themselves. This cross of theory and experience lays out
the topography of specific bodies (or even more

specifically, Anzaldua's body) existing in the liminal

space of the Mexico/U.S. border. As she describes
(embodies) her specific erased, subordinated existence, she

(paradoxically) delineates a subjectivity that extends
beyond her. This body, her body — simultaneously between

and within normatively exclusive subject positions — has

important implications for other bodies whose self

(subjectivity) does not cohere with Western cultural
heteronormativity. This "borderlands" correlates to
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Butler's abject being. Anzaldua's transgression offers the
possibility of existing with and disavowing the abject, as

Anzaldua locates herself within the dissonance.
Anzaldua distinguishes '"borderlands" and
"Borderlands." The proper noun (Borderlands) indicates the
area of northeast Mexico, ceded to the U.S. in 1848 in the

Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, in which Anzaldua's mestiza
consciousness takes root. The common noun (borderlands)
indicates the psychological, spiritual, and sexual

borderlands that "are not particular to the Southwest"

(Borderlands 19). As Anzaldua asserts, "[a] borderland is a

vague and undetermined place created by the emotional
residue of an unnatural boundary" and those who live there

are "in short, those who cross over, pass over, or go
through the confines of the 'normal.'" These "prohibited
and forbidden ... inhabitants" are not simply those who are
illegal, they are "the squint-eyed, the perverse, the

queer, the troublesome" (25). More than just a place, a

borderlands is a social construction; here, identity is
formed less by who people are than by who they are not
(heterosexual, European, white, etc).
As Anzaldua theorizes Chicana identity, she explicitly

leaves room for other interpretations of borderlands.
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Anzaldua brings into relief the duality between allegiance

to and rejection of multiple subject positions. The
Foucaultian subject is formed from without and via the

self-regulatory practice that is an effect of the social
construction; Anzaldua's subject also stakes out a peculiar

reflexive site -- a moment of recognition and dislocation
of self. The importance of this Butlerian turn is that

Anzaldua chooses to remain in that state of dislocation,
and to explore the inability to reconcile the image and the
necessary lack of totality of the "I."
The moment Anzaldua "claims" any sign, she

simultaneously produces that which "remains permanently
concealed by the very linguistic act that offers up the

promise of a transparent revelation" (Butler, "Imitation"
309). That act of concealment multiplies and overlaps

categories of ethnicity, sexuality, and gender. According
to Anzaldua,

The ambivalence from the clash of voices results
in mental and emotional states of perplexity ...

[c]radled in one culture, sandwiched between two

cultures, straddling all three cultures and their
value systems, la mestiza undergoes a struggle of

flesh, a struggle of borders, an inner war. The
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coming together of two self-consistent but
habitually incompatible frames of reference

causes un choque, a cultural collision.

(Borderlands 100)

Anzaldua's cultural choque denotes the crash of "habitually
incompatible" cultural constructions on (in between)

proximate physical spaces and lands, yet she deploys

phrases that suggest that, in the same choque, identity
categories scrape against each other as well (e.g., "clash

of voices," "mental and emotional perplexity").
Male victim may not experience the physical, cultural
aspect of this choque. I contend, however, that a male
victim occupies a similarly impossible space. Anzaldua's

subject is not a "simple". In this multiple otherness, the

body in question both exists within the frame and without,
however it is constructed. Similarly, if metaphorically,

the ostensibly charmed male butts up against the

"habitually incompatible frame of reference," the abject
being "male victim." The subject is within and without

simultaneously. "The struggle is inner ... our psyches
resemble the bordertowns and are populated by the same
people" (109). Anzaldua's concept of the problems of
identity categories, then, might be said to consist of the
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friction, the marks left by the places where the

constructed "cubbyholes stuffed respectively with
intellect, race, class, vocation,

[and] gender" ("To(o)"

267) scrape past one another. Can we break apart normative

heterosexuality's cubbyholes, exclusions, and erasures?
Within compulsory heterosexuality, incest and
adult/child sexuality are among the primary prohibitions,

the excluded sexual possibilities. Butler makes this point

about the conditions under which child sexual abuse occurs:
[O]ne reason why debates about the reality of
sexual abuse of children tend to mistake the

character of the exploitation [is this; i]t is

not simply that a sexuality is unilaterally

imposed by the adult, nor that a sexuality is
unilaterally fantasized by the child, but that
the child's love, a love that is necessary for

its existence, is exploited and a passionate
attachment abused.

(Butler, Psychic 7-8)

Whether or not Butler refers specifically to female on male
sexual abuse, but she certainly acknowledges the abusive

nature of any such adult/child interaction. As I have
previously shown, sexual abuse is only coherent in the form

of male (predator) on female (prey). Compulsory
29

heterosexuality can produce the active male subject

position, but not an active female; and it can produce the
subject position of female victim, but the male victim, due

to the absence of the coded active female, can be produced
only by a male agent. In a case of a female-to-male

incestuous or adult/child sex act with an active (predator)

female, the dissonance created by the conflicting norms of
gender coding and primary prohibitions would be drowned out
by the sound of the march to heterosexuality that recasts

the act as having been desired by the victim.
The male victim of female sexuality is abject in

heteronormative culture. Absent or excluded or incoherent,

the experience has no voice. To get any sense of the
experience, we must look to other voices speaking about
other abject experiences. Kathleen Barry, writing about

female sexual slavery, suggests that "[ujntil we name the
practice, give conceptual definition to it, illustrate its

life over time and in space, those who are its most obvious

victims will also not be able to name it or define their
experience" (qtd in Rich 236). Butler also reminds us what

it means to be invisible: "[t]o be prohibited explicitly is
to occupy a discursive site from which something like a

reverse-discourse can be articulated; to be implicitly
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prohibited is not even to qualify as an object of
prohibition ... It is one thing to be erased from discourse,
and yet another to be present within discourse as an

abiding falsehood" (Butler, "Imitation" 312).

Compulsory heterosexuality constructs possible

identities and codes for gender and sexuality and

simultaneously erases, excludes, renders impossible (throws

off the possibility of) others. Butler has shown that these
identity categories and codes are so pervasive as to

provide the conditions under which a subject can be formed.

When the gender coding of masculine male — as "not
victim," as the only code for active sexuality active, and

as the code for supremacy that contains within it the

illegitimacy of disavowing that supremacy --

clashes/coexists with the sexual impossibility of the
subject position "male victim of female sexual abuse,"

mutually exclusive subjects are formed; a body that exists
across, between, but contained in neither identities is

inscribed.
Anzaldua may provide "male victim" with an analog to

disavow and simultaneously exist within/across the
dissonance of abjection and normative heterosexuality.
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CHAPTER THREE

DISCURSIVE SUBJECTION IN REPRESENTATIONS OF
FEMALE-ON-MALE CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE

In films like All That Jazz (1979), Murmur of the
Heart (1971), Summer of '42 (1971), Harold and Maude

(1971), and Tea and Sympathy (1956), sexual acts between

adult woman and minor boys "are seen as healthy gateways to
manhood" (Gartner N. Pag.). Discussing his film Murmur of

the Heart, Louis Malle said, "Maybe it's better to make a

film about making love with your mother than dreaming about
it all your life" (DeBruge 38). Heteronormative society,
reflected in these films, routinely constructs the act of a

woman having sex with a boy, even incest, as a rite of
passage.
Critical reaction to these films has reinforced the
normative value of these representations. Critics from The

New York Times, The London Daily Telegraph, and others have

described Murmur of the Heart as "delicate" (Kakutani Bl)
and "poignant" (Monahan 12). Posts at online communities

like "The Internet Movie Database" and "NetFlix"

participate in the discursively constructed notion that
these portrayals are simply coming-of-age stories.
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Compulsory Heterosexuality in
Murmur of the Heart
That director Louis Malle's 1971 film Murmur of the
Heart was (and continues to be) popular and well-received

is not in question. The film is generally considered to be

a powerful coming-of-age story. It received an Academy
Award nomination for best original screenplay and was

nominated for the Palme d'Or at the Cannes Film Festival.
•If the film represents a coming-of-age, then examining
the etymology and usage of "coming-of age" may be

productive for the discussion of normative practices. I
suggest that the denotation and connotation of the term
"coming-of-age" demonstrate its normative qualities.

The term "coming-of-age" denotes the age at which a
child legally becomes responsible for his or her actions.

The usage of the term out of that literal context creates
something different: a new moment or process that it

presumes to describe; the usage then imposes that moment
onto speculative subjects. It relies upon the denotation to

infer that in order to fall within the laws of the culture,
everyone must "come of age." This is not simple aging,
however; this is a cultural (un)marking. Speculative

subjects arrive at a point at which they must perform a
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ritual set of behaviors, the enactment of which unmarks
them and allows them acceptance into the normative culture.

Failure to do so must result in the formation of a

Butlerian abject being, relegated to that "'unlivable' and
'uninhabitable' zones of social life" (Bodies 3). Indeed,

as I will suggest, the film demonstrates the demarcation of
these livable and unlivable zones and the force that

compulsory heterosexuality must exert on speculative
subjects to adhere to the norm. Coming-of-age, then, is

simply one part of the "work... which the whole of society
pursues on each individual through innumerable mechanisms

of discipline" (Foucault "Discipline" 1643). And in this
film, coming-of-age is represented as the successful

completion of the heterosexual act of coitus.

The stakes are high. Achieving heterosexuality serves
the normative societal function to "transform the sexual
conduct of couples into a concerted economic and political

behavior" (Foucault "History" 1653) and this imperative is
clear in the upper middle-class family portrayed in the

film. The church, school, family structure, and all the

various "mechanisms of discipline" will be brought to bear.
In this film, Laurent, the 14-year-old protagonist,
does not appear to struggle with who he is; he is
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intellectual, sensitive, clumsy, and likes jazz music.
Still something is not right. These traits stand in

contrast to those of his brothers, who have been expelled
from school, drink and carouse and generally perform the
part of healthy young male heterosexual. In the absence of
the qualities of maleness that his brothers possess, the

film asserts a deficiency present in Laurent. He is not
adhering to the norm; he must have a problem. His brothers,

his father, his school friends, a representative of the
church and others attack the problem in a series of events
that train him in the norms of male heterosexuality.

Ultimately, though, Laurent's failure to successfully
perform the heterosexual act of coitus that will constitute

him as a male heterosexual requires an intervention by his

mother, who rescues Laurent's faltering heterosexuality by

sleeping with him. The necessity of the performance of the
part of heterosexuality is so important that the mother is

willing to violate the taboo of incest to get her son to
adhere to the norm.
I will look at' a few specific scenes from the film

that demonstrate Butler's notion of performativity. The

film offers several examples of the "set of acts within a
highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to
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produce the appearance of...a natural sort of being" (qtd in

Jagose 84. That the performances — and the cultural
narratives they invoke (of gender, of sex, of deviance) --

appear so naturally within the film underscores their
normative power. The representation of these acts echo
societal expectations, which in turn reinforces the

representation, and the circle of discursive production is
complete.
Early in the film, Laurent's brothers enter his room.

The middle brother Marc, dressed in full drag — hat,

heels, necklace and all — starts to coo mockingly at
Laurent. As the brothers close in on Laurent, they undress

him and comment that he is "pink and sweet good to eat"
(Murmur). In a deconstructive way, the blur of the line of

gender represented by Marc in drag is an enforcement of
that line, while Marc's taunt of Laurent stands in for the

derision of the object of imitation — their mother.

Later in the scene, the boys notice that Laurent has
an erection. One could wonder if Laurent's erection means

he is attracted to the image of a man in drag, but the boys

redirect the homo-erotic display into a comparison of penis
size. With this act the brothers are performing a "ritual

reiterated under and through constraint, under and through
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the force of prohibition" (Butler Bodies 95) which in
effect reconstitutes the heterosexuality of the scene.

Indeed, when the housekeeper enters the room at the end of
the scene, the older boys continue their performance, at
one point pushing her over and imitating a sexual assault;
older woman, for her part, simply laughs. She knows that

this performance is intended to produce healthy

heterosexuality, which exists peaceful along a continuum

with rape, but not with homosexuality. Eve Kosofsky's

Sedgwick's radically disrupted homosocial continuum (2433)
is in full force here, as the boys' performances cross the
ritual (constructed) boundaries of heterosexual/homosexual

and normal/deviant in order to show those boundaries and to

indicate exactly what is prescribed and what is prohibited.
Representation of the performance of actual homosexual
in Murmur of the Heart serves only to demonstrate the
"threat of ostracism" (Butler 95) present in it. When

Laurent is called from class to attend mandatory
confession, the boys yell at him to "watch his butt"
(Murmur) with the priest. In confession, the priest follows

the dictum that Foucault outlined: "sex must not be named
imprudently, but its aspects, its correlations, and its
effects must be pursued down to their slenderest
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ramifications" ("History" 1649). He asks Laurent to be very

specific about his thoughts and actions, and despite (or
because of) the fact that Laurent confesses to masturbating

many times, including twice with his brother Marc, the

focus remains on the (implied) perversions of the priest.
Laurent's behaviors do not yet constitute a performance

outside of Butler's domain of the subject.
The priest then stops the confession to talk to

Laurent "as a friend, not a confessor" (Murmur) and
proceeds to warn him of the danger of behaving outside the
norm. The priest earnestly tells Laurent that "we are all
weak" and that "for those who vow chastity, it's a

struggle, believe me" as he touches the boy's shoulder. By
the time he cautions Laurent to "think of your future wife"

and to "watch out" not to "form habits that" will be
"impossible to break" (Murmur), we see an example of

Foucault's panopticon. The priest has internalized the
prohibition against homosexuality. He is now the confessor

and his confession is a cautionary one -- do not turn out

like me. The priest is speaking as an abject being. He is

demonstrating the constitutive outside of the domain of the
subject in order to delineate that domain for the young

Laurent.
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Back in the classroom, one of the boys in the class

draws and passes around a particularly graphic note, in
which the priest — misshapen, dressed in collar and cross
but nude from the waist down — fiendishly holds a naked

woman by the hair. The equation homosexual equals deviant

is complete. The priest is the picture of Foucault's
invented homosexual who is "a type of life, a life form,

and a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a

mysterious physiology" ("History" 1663). That the priest

barely reacts to the drawing is another iteration of self
regulation; he recognizes his own "species" (1663).

The culturally normative view of lesbians is also
presented in a scene in which two 16 year-old girlfriends

are dancing together. Laurent's friend Hubert announces, in

a classic proclamation of the heterosexual imperative, that
the girls are lesbians. Laurent later asserts the same
thing to his mother -- ostensibly because his advances

toward one of the girls were rebuffed -- the audience is
cued that Laurent has made some progress toward conformity

to the patriarchy. He has acquired homophobia.
Still, the boy is not a man. Despite the "proximities"

and "insistent observation[,]" the "exchange of discourses,
through questions that exhorted admissions, and confidences
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that went beyond the questions that were asked" (Foucault

"History" 1663), Laurent is angry, frustrated and mean. The

film appears to trace the source of Laurent's dismay to a
particular moment in the film. Early in the film, Laurent's
older brothers drunkenly break into the room where he is in

the middle of having sex with a prostitute they have paid
for. This concept of the male virgin being constituted into

a man by a prostitute is a familiar performance of the

introduction to heterosexuality, and it is reverentially
portrayed, until the boys barge in and literally pull

Laurent off the woman. In a quick cut to the next day, the
brothers apologize — something they will not do throughout
the rest of the film, even after other more criminal

behavior, such as the theft and sale of family heirlooms or
forgery of a priceless work of art. In their behavior with

Laurent and the prostitute, the brothers realize that they
have a sense that they have interfered with the necessary
production of a’norm; their interference represents a

rupture of the "highly rigid regulatory frame" (Butler qtd.
in Jagose 84) that is required for Laurent to come of age.

A remarkable scene at the end of the movie represents
what is at stake if Laurent does not come of age and make

it to normative heterosexuality. While wearing his mother's
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bathrobe, Laurent carefully lays out selected pieces of his
mother's clothing on the bed: bra, panties, garter,

stockings, dress, and pearls. He dresses in her clothing

and in the bathroom mirror, while he applies mascara and
makeup, he recites words he overheard his mother and her

lover exchange. He repeats them again and again. He seems
at ease in this performance, but the absence of his concern

is the concern. It is "the departure from the norm, the
anomaly...that haunt [s] the school, the court, the asylum or

the prison" (Foucault "Discipline" 1641) and it is this
that should haunt Laurent, as it haunts the priest. If he

repeats this behavior, he becomes the pervert, and
constitutes himself as deviant.
Finally, though, Laurent's mother and he go to a

Bastille Day celebration. She gets drunk and he escorts her
home. She unceremoniously kisses him, then again and again

and the scene ends. The absence of the representation of

the performance of the sex act is the iteration of its
presence, and it asserts the normativity of the
performance; it does not even need to be shown. As Foucault

observes: "There is no binary division to be made between

what one says and what one does not say; we must try to
determine the different ways of not saying such things, how
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those who can and those who cannot speak of them are
distributed, which type of discourse is authorized, or
which form of discretion is required in either case"

("History" 1654).
At the beginning of the next scene, the "ways of not
saying things" (1654), the distribution of authorized

discourses, along with the forms of discretion are outlined
to Laurent by his mother. She tells him that they will
remember this as a "beautiful and solemn moment that will

never happen again" (Murmur). There is no need for it to
happen again; the performance of the sexual act has

constituted his identity as heterosexual. The mother can
indeed remember the event "without remorse, tenderly"

(Murmur); the continuity of the systems of power "make it
possible to...legitimize disciplinary power, which thus

avoids any element of excess or abuse it may entail"
(Foucault "Discipline" 1643). The mother's actions, however
abusive, are disciplinary and excused by the exigency of

the norm.
The results of the performance become readily
apparent. Laurent gets out of the bed, his mother still

asleep, and goes off down the hall as the bells ring 4 AM.

He knocks on the door of one of the young girls in the same
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hotel, and when she opens the door, grabs her and starts to
fondle her. When she protests, he simply asks where her
friend's room is. The rituals that his brothers performed

for him are now available to Laurent. He has internalized

the system. He is normal.
When Laurent makes his way back to the room he shares

with his mother, his father and brothers are there, eating

breakfast. His father seems angry with him; his father has

been angry with him the whole film. The father sternly asks

Laurent where he has been; Laurent's crumpled clothes and
tousled hair tell where he has been. Without a word from

Laurent, one by one the entire family breaks into laughter.
Everything is all right now that everyone knows Laurent is

unmarked; he has come of age.
Malle's statement that "it's better to make a film

about making love with your mother than dreaming about it
all your life" (DeBruge 38) bears repeating. It should be

shocking, however, in its heteronormative context, it is
quaint, almost funny. That Malle could confess such a

"perversion" attests to the power of the norm of

heterosexuality to privilege those who are constituted as

its subject. Malle can lay claim to such a position at
least in part because of the representation of the
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heterosexual norm in the film. He is one of "those who

can...speak" (Foucault "History" 1654), and the force of that

subjectivity is not easily shaken loose, even by a stated
desire to have sex with his mother. That desire simply
restates the Freudian norm that it, in turn, supports.

Murmur of the Heart represents the exigent enforcement

of the heterosexual norm; the successful performance of

heterosexual sex outweighs the taboo of incest. Foucault
suggests that "the type of power...brought to bear on the
body and sex...had neither the form of law, nor the effects

of the taboo" and that "it did not set up a barrier; it
provided places of maximum saturation" (1665); if this is
true, then Louis Malle's Murmur of the Heart is one of

those areas of saturation.

Other Perspectives

Critics at the time of the release and since have

hailed Murmur of the Heart; critical response to the film
appears to validate the normative value of the
representations in the film and within European and

/American culture. Critics of the film, when they consider

the representation of the act of incest (which many do
not), find various ways to interpret the act in socially
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acceptable terms. I believe this refiguring occurs, in

part, as critics attempt to reconcile the cognitive
dissonance between the culturally constructed primary

prohibition of incest and the positive representation of

Laurent at the end of the film. Additionally, though,
critics' reinterpretation enacts the impossibility of the
subject position "male victim of female sexual abuse."4
Critics do not question the mother's deployment of power

over her child; in some cases, authors cite it (in the form

of love or caring) as the motive for the act.
Mary Hamer, in her book Incest: A New Perspective,
suggests that incest enacts an abuse of power not unlike

that which occurs in hierarchical' structures such as

education and religion. She also maintains "scepticism

about the use of incest as a bugbear" (53), and suggests
that the persistent notion that incest may not always be

wrong leads her to question "what is causing the breakdown

in love" (3).
While much of Hamer's point of view is consistent with

my premise, her consideration of Murmur of the Heart falls
short in several aspects. First, of the six works she
considers, Murmur of the Heart alone represents female-on-

male incest. Unfortunately, Hamer also offers only Murmur
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of the Heart as an example of a work that successfully
defuses the negative aspects associated with incest. She

suggests that the movie offers "no place for trauma, or for

catastrophic transgression" (52). I contend that the abject
being "male victim of female sexual abuse" cannot cohere

with catastrophe; if the "subject" does not exist, there is
no locus for pain. Finally, Hamer recites the

heteronormative line when she suggests that the mother

"continues to see her job in terms of protecting the life
that is in her son" so that his "wish both for closeness
and independence" will not become "a predatory force when

it is systematically and repeatedly thwarted, as in the
figure of the celibate priest" (53). This version
reinforces compulsory heterosexuality's demands that the

mother intervene so that Laurent can become a ratified
subj ect.

If Hamer sets out to radically reconsider abuse as an

exercise of control and power, here she misses an important
opportunity to extend that understanding to include boys.
She does not fail to perceive abuse in all contexts; Hamer

has no trouble demonstrating the exercise of power present
in other, more conventional representations, such as
Nabokov's Lolita. She claims that "[f]ar from being a story
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of love ... Lolita tells of a mounting violence" (143) and
that although Lolita dies in childbirth, "[i]t is as a

child she died to herself much earlier" (149). Hamer only
struggles to see past the norm of male victimizer/female
victim, past the oedipal scenario.

In addition to simply failing to perceive any boy as a
victim (or any mother as a victimizer), Hamer may have been

influenced by what Philippe Carrard calls the redondance 3
in the film; Carrard extends Susan Suleiman's view of

redondance to suggest that Malle creates an "acceptable"
incest by controlling aspects of the cultural narratives

presented in the film in order to allow only one reading.

Carrard suggests that Malle deploys, among other

things, time and location (the act of incest takes place at

a spa far from the home on Bastille Day) to control
available points of view. By creating an irresistible

overwhelming atmosphere of carnaval, Malle can reasonably
suspend the prohibition of incest.

Carrard marvels at the "almost perfect consensus" that

the film "is a masterpiece of taste and sensitivity" (693),
and challenges that view without addressing it directly. He
suggests that male dominant orthodoxy haunts the film, and
that the heteronormative fantasy of older woman-younger boy
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sex clouds the likelihood of trauma represented in the
film. Carrard does not make any claim about the existence

(or lack) of trauma in the film; he focuses on the
availability of cultural constructions that makes a

"positive" incest plausible.
In an overview of Malle's early films, Hugo Frey

dismisses concern for the act of incest in Murmur of the
Heart by suggesting that the "episode" is simply "ironic"

(32), a claim he neither substantiates nor for which I can
find much evidence. Many critics gloss the incest in this

way; this acknowledges — through silence -- that further

investigation presents a larger problem than the critic

cares to undertake.

Perhaps the most telling account of how Murmur of the
Heart represents compulsory heterosexuality's fantasies

comes from a brief interview with Oscar-nominated American
film director Wes Anderson. Anderson speaks the cultural

narrative that others only suggest:
The stuff between him and the mother feels more
kind of romantic almost -- but also taboo and

scary in a way, which makes it even more

seductive ... You know it's not traumatic -- it
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ends up being an expression of how close they

are, and how connected they are.

(Monahan 12)

To Anderson, sex is "stuff," and the boy that Anderson

envisions possesses the independence and strength to
understand that — the boy is just an extension of
Anderson. Anderson's fantasy, like Malle's, represents the
desire of a man looking backward at childhood, not that of

the child in the experience. Anderson's words, like
Malle's, have validity because they come from a subject

previously constituted outside the domain of the abject.
Unfortunately, no one has yet spoken adequately, or so

loudly, to the abject being's disjuncture between reality
and fantasy.
One theorist disembodies the notion of child abuse so
completely that his revisionist assertions almost nullify

the concept of abuse. James Kincaid's Erotic Innocence
asserts that the myth of childhood innocence has
infiltrated cultural narratives surrounding child abuse.
Loosely following Foucault's assertions about sexuality,
Kincaid suggests that a contemporaneous "fabrication of the

modern child" (52) essentialized childhood as a "biological

category" (53). Imbued with a variety of conflicting
qualities, this new entity's negative sexuality -- the
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innocent absence of sexuality that invokes sexuality by its

absence -- continues to both allure and repel adults.
According to Kincaid, this duality of allure and recoil has
given ri.se to narratives of abuse. He deploys the

presumption that narratives are, by nature, contingent
reconstructions that should not be mistaken for truth.
I doubt that Kincaid intends to trivialize all

narratives of abuse, yet he caricatures, many of those

narratives: narratives of false/recovered/implanted memory;

of false accusation; of childhood sexual innocence;
including the backlash and counterbacklash. His tone
throughout the piece conveys his derision. For example,
Kincaid inserts a Gilbert and Sullivan chorus to mock Alan

Dershowitz's The Abuse Excuse (270); in another passage, he

refers to a therapist and patient as Tweedledee and
Tweedledum. Mocking the subject of his exploration detracts
from the serious intent of his project.

Kincaid asserts that "we [have] eroticiz [ed] ...empty
innocence" (17) and that this somehow implicates children

in the deployment of power over them that the eroticization
creates, whether children possess actual innocence or not.

He fails to consider that the ready availability of consent

(the persistent difficulty of withholding consent) -- along
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with exercises of power present in the enactment of abuse provide the opportunity for abuse more than imagined

innocence ever could.

Kincaid ultimately suffers most, though, from a lack
of consistency. When it suits his purpose, narratives seem
to emerge from a conveyor belt of cultural production;
agency is hidden and suspect. Some are "myths-on-wheels
that, despite the backlash and vigorous refutation, keep

rolling along" (81), others "are simply there, plain and
simple" (4). When it suits Kincaid differently, individuals
deploy and control cultural narratives; in fact, Kincaid
suggests that we "try our hand at a new story-telling"

(280) in order to create a new world, in which abuse
ostensibly ceases to exist because we no longer tell
stories about it. He does not account for how narratives of
actual abuse might figure onto this positive outlook. In my

view, agency exists somewhere in the middle ground; it
deploys more nimbly than a monolith yet resists isolated
attempts at change.

Agency

The theoretical and embodied existence of available

identities (subject positions) presents a paradox of
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agency. Who possesses the agency to radically redistribute
control of available identities sifted by race, by gender,

by sexual object choice, or by adherence to a norm? The
discursive production of norms occurs in such a way that it
appears "natural" to most; to others, charmed bodies

sinisterly (or at least unconsciously) control the
production. Still others note that agency moves within in a
movable blend of societal production and individual

performance. Whether norms can change quickly or remain

relatively constant, the production of those norms is

reflected, recreated, and reinforced in the performances of

individual within and without identity.

Judith Butler, by reconsidering the body, offers a
guide:

None of us can truly answer to the demand to "get

over yourself!" The demand to overcome radically

the constitutive restraints by which cultural

viability is achieved would be its own form of
violence. But when that very viability is itself

the consequence of a repudiation, a

subordination, or an exploitative relation, the

negotiation becomes increasingly complex....
Doubtlessly crucial is the ability to wield the
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signs of subordinated identity in a public domain
that constitutes its own homophobic and racist

hegemonies through the erasure or domestication
of culturally or politically constituted

identities. ... [However,] every insistence on

identity must at some point lead to a taking
stock of the constitutive exclusions that

reconsolidate hegemonic power differentials,

exclusions that each articulation was forced to
make in order to proceed.

(Bodies 118)

The attempt to bring abject beings into a livable zone

requires a reflexive, modulated claim to identity that
periodically asks those constructed in that identity to
work against its necessarily limiting scope. For bodies
constructed at once within, in between, and outside various

identity positions, the question may simply be: how do I

know who I am?
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NOTES

1 W. Holmes and G. Slap's "Sexual Abuse of Boys:
Definition, Prevalence, Correlates, Sequelae, and

Management" (JAMA 280 [1998]: 1855-1862) offers statistical
information about the effects of sexual abuse on boys.

2 David Halperin's analogy between food choice and

sexual object choice suggests that prohibiting certain

practices does not make sense. It may further be
interpreted to reinforce the legitimacy of the notion of
"child as sexual object choice". His observation is apropos
and lacks only a consideration of consent; vegetarians
would argue that meat-eating is wrong precisely because it

lacks consent.
3 Literally translated, redondance means 'redundancy;'

Carrard uses it to mean a "surplus of information that
compensates for loss due to other points of view and
assures the preservation of the message" (695).

4 Some of the authors disclaim their position with

regard to child abuse: Hamer admits she has no "personal
experience of incest or sexual abuse" (2); and Kincaid
writes that "this talk of 'stories' does not mean that I

regard child molesting as unreal" (3). The authors may be
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responding proactively to expected normative emotional

response to their theoretical positions; but I suggest that
these disclaimers may also represent one of the practical
limits of theory: it lacks force when it does not reflect

the specific experiences of specific bodies.
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